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the general trends of privatisation. Chapters
2 to 6 identify some empirical conditions
such as demography, public finance, civil
service, the case of the industrial port of
Wenzhou (the site of a pilot project for the
reform of private investment rules), and for-
eign direct investment, respectively, to illus-
trate the unique conditions of Chinese
political economy and the strategy of privati-
sation adopted by the Chinese government.
Chapter 7 describes the culmination of the tip-
ping point, according to the author, when the
1997 Asian financial crisis met the endoge-
nous policy pressure toward privatisation.
According to the author, this book does not
intend to be framed under any a priori theo-
retical discipline. Instead, it is written from
the Chinese perspective, covering the political
economy from both pre-reform as well as the
reform periods. As the author pointed out at
the very beginning, the central argument of
the book ‘is that privatization of the post-Mao
economy is largely due to the state’s increas-
ing inability to reply on the public sector to
address two critical concerns for regime sur-
vival: employment and revenue’. Policies of
privatisation naturally followed the specific
requirements of Chinese political economy. In
terms of the process of privatisation, based on
the 1995 guidelines, there were four rounds of
revisions made by the State Council from
1997 to 2007, resulting in allowing a broader
inflow of foreign capital in various service
sectors, such as banking, wholesale and pro-
fessional services. Also, after those revisions,
certain sectors of wholly foreign-owned enter-
prises were eventually allowed to enter the
Chinese economy.
To back up the argument for increasing
central government revenues, the author
describes the system for tax separation (fen-
shuizhi), which was introduced after 1994.
This allowed the local official to better posi-
tion them for ‘performance evaluation and in
the generation and control of discretionary
resources’. Yet, the consequence of fenshuizhi
unavoidably pushed local officials to use any
means to help generate revenues, leading to
the later policy of rule bending across almost
all Chinese economic sectors.
Amongst others, the author uses the Wen-
zhou pilot project to illustrate how rule bend-
ing has become part of the Wenzhou
entrepreneurial spirit. The notorious business
practices and (over) competition from Wen-
zhou entrepreneurs, especially in areas such
as shadow banking as well as property specu-
lations, were widely reported and criticised.
The author examines the outcomes of rule
bending, which led to many famous business
people fromWenzhou (including eight promi-
nent entrepreneurs) ending up in jail. Policy
bending and irregularities create a tempting
environment for business entrepreneurs to
engage in economic crime as well as prevent-
ing other local enterprises from expanding.
As a result of privatisation, the author
concluded that ‘Between the 1985 and 1995
industrial censuses, for example, the total
number of foreign-invested industrial enter-
prises increased by eighty-six times’.
Between 1985 and 1998 the total number of
foreign-invested industrial enterprises
increased from 516 to 26,448. In terms of
geographical area, for example in Guang-
dong province, 36.5 per cent of private-for-
eign JV (joint-venture) was in the Pearl River
Delta. Yet, it is in this area that the author
could have developed further the relations
between the Pearl River Delta and the distri-
bution of those private investments.
As a book on the political economy of
China, the statistical evidence is impressive,
but, for wider audiences, there is room for
further developing the examination of when
privatisations occur, geographical locations
and specific areas of privatisations. This
book is particularly useful for academics and
others who wish to understand China’s
unique political economy.
Centre for Contemporary Chinese Studies, Dur-
ham University
Humans of the world unite
Jenny Andersson
The Emergence of Globalism Visions of World
Order in Britain and the United States, 1939–
1950, by Or Rosenboim. Princeton University
Press. 338 pp. £31.95.
The global is a utopian dream, a space pro-
jected as much from the failures of nation-
state-based politics in the twentieth century,
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as from true visions of how the world might
be better organised and governed. Or Rosen-
boim’s The Emergence of Globalism is a panora-
mic account of visions of world order in the
second half of the twentieth century, begin-
ning with the outbreak of the Second World
War and ending with the Korean crisis which
began in 1950. This period, Rosenboim sug-
gests, is marked by a great plurality of
dreams of how the world could be united,
and how the aggressive politics of nation-
states could be replaced by new forms of
world cooperation and federation. Most of
these visions turn out to be flawed, inherently
limited by forms of nationalist or Anglocen-
tric bias, by legacies of past imperial dreams,
or by the rivalry between great intellectuals
with differing notions of what a united world
would be—which racial, political or geo-
graphical hierarchy it would reflect, and
whose intelligence and civilisation it should
promote. The Emergence of Globalism is argu-
ably the first study that examines the richness
of these 1940s arguments for readers in politi-
cal and intellectual history. In so doing the
text also makes a significant contribution to
studies of globalism.
In recent years, intellectual historians and
students of international relations theory
have become increasingly interested in the
history of that particular space situated
beyond the national level and encompassing
(at least in principle) the totality of human-
ity. In the history of science, historians have
long since shown how natural scientists,
armed with predictions of weather and cli-
mate, turned the world into a natural object,
planet Earth. Historians of international rela-
tions and political history have been slower
in bringing out the also fascinating history of
how this planet was constituted not just as a
natural ecosystem, but as an interconnected
social and political system and product of
world politics. Globality studies—which
became a fad in the history profession fol-
lowing its turn away from methodological
nationalism and its simultaneous rejection of
sociological theories of globalisation—are the
study of specific visions of the world and
the kinds of chaos and order that at different
points in time were understood to be gov-
erning this world.
Of course, human beings have always
lived in the world, but ideas of how this
world should be governed, what should be
the right relationship between nation-states
and between peoples are highly historically
specific. Globality refers to the process by
which, many historians argue, the world
was perceived not as a combination of vari-
ous different entities, but by key processes of
interdependence and integration. Some histo-
rians have seen that process as beginning in
new communication technologies which
enabled new forms of connectivity, while
others have seen globality as a theoretical
and intellectual shift from nation and empire
to the level of the world. According to
Rosenboim, the central importance of the
global was that it substituted ideas of empire
in debates about geography, international
relations, and liberal politics from the 1940s
on. At the same time, visions of world order
in the 1940s were still necessarily limited,
reflecting debates in which race was still a
pertinent category, and in which nations
were understood as having a solid heartland
and an expansive frontier. The global, Rosen-
boim suggests, was a space for the projection
of ideas of sovereignty, freedom and deci-
sion on behalf of those many liberals who by
1939 were convinced that empires were
defeated and that nation-states had failed to
procure stable forms of peace. Most of these
intellectuals were American and British thin-
kers schooled in history and theories of
empire. Their visions of the world had a
bias, and as such, visions of world order
often ‘collapsed into a defence of Western
moral and political values’.
It is here that Rosenboim’s hugely ambi-
tious book, which includes debates from the
Austrian neoliberal, Friedrich von Hayek, to
the American historian and literary critic,
Lewis Mumford, is somewhat at odds with
the more critical literature on intellectual
world history and globality. Most such stud-
ies have aimed to open up a largely western-
centric narrative of the world, look for new
materials in Arabic or Chinese literatures, or
for forms of reception and interpretation in
the former colonies. Rosenboim’s book is
unapologetically western, and that is fine,
but it would have been interesting to see her
engage more clearly with the scholarship
that has proposed that such visions of world
order carried racist, eugenicist and Victorian
ideas of order into the emergent project of
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cosmopolitan world governance after 1945
(see Victorian Visions of World Order, edited
by Duncan Bell, 2007). Rosenboim also
makes a problematic compartmentalisation
of her study by ending it in 1950 on the
grounds that discourses on world order and
world federation petered out after 1950, only
to return, but in a much different form, in
visions of global integration after 1989. The
latter is a very questionable conclusion—the
1960s and 1970s were decades in which there
was a massive eruption of forms of world
organisation (many of them with origins in
immediate post-war forms of world federal-
ism). Many of these, such as the World
Order Model Project by Harold Lasswell, or
by the Quakers, were, in contrast to many of
Rosenboim’s examples, attempts to break
radically with earlier visions of world unity
as a continuation of imperial or national
community. They tried to conceive of other
forms of unity, and also advocated bypass-
ing politics altogether by creating planetary
social movements and citizens’ groups.
In 1964, the world peace movement, which
was split between the communist and the
liberal world, attempted to create a genuine
form of world organisation under the name
of Mankind 2000, and in the same years, the
World Council of Churches similarly tried to
envision forms of world unity by rejecting
the nation as the basis of citizenship. By the
early 1970s, radical visions of globality were
also not merely western and liberal, as in
Rosenboim’s examples, but also inspired by
the return of Marxism, for instance in the
dependency theory that spurred Third
Worldist arguments of a New International
Economic Order.
The relatively narrow chronological sec-
tion charted by Rosenboim is marked by a
particular version of world order thinking
linked to federalism. Federalism, in turn,
was a liberal project, directly linked to key
debates in liberal political theory during the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and fed-
eralism envisioned ‘the global’ first and fore-
most as a system of interconnected and
sovereign states. Rosenboim carefully lays
out the semantics of this argument and
shows that within this field there was ample
divergence—from racial visions to emergent
cosmopolitanism—and also unexpected
forms of circulation. For instance, in the idea
of the frontier or the heartland from Ger-
many to the US, she is less interested in the
way that federalism was itself just one of
many different projections of the kind of
unity and organisation that a united world
would be, than how federalism also encom-
passed key choices in political history that
then came to have a real significance on the
future of the world. She is closest to this dis-
cussion in the chapter on European federal-
ism, and of the way in which in the history
of the European project, federalism became a
response to debates about the polarity of
world order and the growing influence, par-
ticularly that of China.
Visions of European federation thus
opposed a federal Franco-German Europe to
the USA and to China, while simultaneously
creating what scholars have recently referred
to as ‘Eurafrique’—projections of a formerly
colonial African continent, still tied economi-
cally to the future of Europe (see Peo
Hansen and Stefan Jansson, Eurafrica. The
Untold History of European Integration and Col-
onization, 2014). Rosenboim adds here to a
budding but not at all exhaustive literature
on the constitution of the Third World (a
concept which emerged in the early 1950s)
in relation to new forms of western and
northern unity that reiterated essentially
imperial arguments of the economic role of
the former colonies.
While naturally not all of these things
would have fitted in one book, and because
there are earlier studies of the longer geneal-
ogy of ideas of world governance, Rosen-
boim makes little attempt to connect her
visions of world order with the longer legacy
of visions of empire, on the one hand, or
more radical visions of world order as glob-
ality, on the other. What she describes as
globalist ideology thus in the end appears as
a relatively continuous strand of Anglo-
Saxon political thought. Indeed, the core con-
cepts that Rosenboim traces in visions of
world order—for instance sovereignty and
freedom—are concepts key to the history of
liberalism. Other concepts, such as justice,
welfare, or human need, that carried a sec-
ond wave of globalist arguments from the
mid 1960s on, carry less weight in her analy-
sis.
CNRS, Sciences Po, Paris
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